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INTRODUCTION
In December 1977, Congress passed and President Carter signed
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 in response to discoveries
made during the Watergate investigations of payments by United
States companies to foreign officials and political parties.2 Section 102
of the FCPA3 set record keeping and internal control requirements,
while sections 1034 and 1041 established standards of payments to for-
eign governmental officials. Critics sharply attacked the FCPA for its
dual enforcement by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Justice Department, 6 the costs of meeting the Act's accounting stan-
dards,7 the problems of controlling agents,8 the many ambiguities in
the Act's provisions, and the need for a multilateral solution to the mul-
tinational problem of corrupt payments to foreign officials. 9 In response
to these criticisms, Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island introduced
Senate Bill No. 708 to "amend and clarify the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977."'I0 On November 23, 1981, the Senate approved the
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2 Over 400 corporations, including 117 of Fortune's 500, admitted making questionable or
illegal payments, with the total exceeding 300 million dollars. Disclosure of these payments has
allegedly precipitated "the removal of a Central American president, embarrassed a Philippine
regime, led to a constitutional crisis in the Netherlands, caused legislative paralysis in Japan, and
shaken an Italian government." McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Pay-
ments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1071, 1072
(1978). See also H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY: MORE THAN
THREE YEARS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (1981); Lowenfeld, Questionable
Corporation Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1976); Stevenson,
The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAW. 53, 57 (1976).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (amending § 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (Supp. IV 1980).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. IV 1980).
6 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
10 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simpiffication Ac.t: Joint Hearings befare the Sub-
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Business Practices and Records Act, a bill only slightly different from
the Chafee proposal.1
This comment will examine the Senate's proposed amendment to
the FCPA, taking into consideration the resulting economic, political,
and moral burdens. The first section reviews criticism of the FCPA's
accounting and anti-bribery provisions. The following section analyzes
whether and how the Business Practices and Records Act (BPRA) ad-
dresses the FCPA's shortcomings. In addition, this comment discusses
possible effects of the Senate's proposal on the possibility of a multilat-
eral agreement on corrupt payments to foreign officials, and on purely
private transactions.
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
Accounting Provisions
The FCPA's accounting provisions amended section 13(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 While the original section 13(b) re-
quired reports from issuers of securities, the accounting provisions of
the FCPA require companies reporting under section 13(b) to establish
records which reflect transactions "in reasonable detail," and to main-
tain internal accounting control systems to assure compliance with the
FCPA.' 3 These provisions were designed to eliminate bookkeeping
methods that concealed questionable or illegal payments.14 The maxi-
mum penalties for violating these provisions include fines up to $10,000
and five years imprisonment. 5
The FCPA accounting provisions have several shortcomings.
comm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearings].
11 127 CONG. REC. S13,971-85 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981). A bill to amend the FCPA has also
been introduced in the House (H.R. 2530). However, as of October, 1982, hearings had not yet
begun on H.R. 2530, and will not begin until the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection and Finance have concluded their FCPA oversight hear-
ings. See House Subcommittee Asks USTR for Corporate Details Regarding FCPA Problems,
[Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 380, at 82 (Oct. 27, 1981).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
13 Section 102 of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980), provides:
(2) Every issuer. . . shall-
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer, and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances. ...
14 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. IV 1980) provides that "[a]ny person who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter (other than section 78dd-1 of this title) . . . shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
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Since the FCPA was enacted, many United States companies affected
by the Act have adopted tighter internal controls, finding it necessary
constantly to document and test internal control systems and to in-
crease the use of audit committees.' 6 Yet many persons contend that
many of these measures were unnecessary, and have only occurred due
to the uncertainty in the FCPA's accounting provisions.' 7 Commenta-
tors argue that the requirements of "reasonable detail' t and "reason-
able assurances"' 9 do not provide concrete guidelines for establishing
an internal control system. In addition, there is no scienter require-
ment under the accounting provisions and United States businesses
may be exposed to potential criminal and civil liability for uninten-
tional errors in company books.2 0 A violation is determined by a "rea-
sonably prudent man" test,2 ' which does little to define the necessary
standards and is totally unsuited for determining criminal liability.
22
Together, these factors result in increased costs for accounting and
internal audit controls. An investigation by the General Accounting
Office revealed that about seventy-two percent of the corporations re-
sponding to its survey had increased accounting and auditing costs by
at least eleven percent because of the FCPA, and nearly a third of these
companies reported increases exceeding thirty-five percent.23 These
costs stem from the severe criminal penalties of the FCPA for account-
16 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S.
BUSINESS 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]; Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 358 (testi-
mony of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
17 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 118, 290, 344; H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, spra
note 2, at 7; Note, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of1977" A TransactionalAnaIysis, 13 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 367, 373 (1979).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). One set of commentators has noted that the
requirement of "adequate" internal controls was so broad that it might "be compared to revising
the criminal code to 'citizens must behave themselves.'" H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra
note 2, at 9.
20 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 161, discussing the FCPA's lack of a scienter require-
ment in its accounting provisions.
21 The SEC has asserted that the test is whether a defendant "failed to act as a reasonable and
prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances." This and other SEC
comments are reprinted in the appendix to GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 84.
22 The SEC has stated that it would recommend criminal prosecution "only in the most seri-
ous and egregious cases." Id at 71. Yet this statement itself leaves much doubt as to when the
SEC will seek prosecution, and "[i]t is of small comfort to an executive when his lawyer tells him
he may be liable under the law-personally and corporately-but not to worry because the Gov-
ernment may not prosecute." 127 CONG. REC. S13,972 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981) (remarks of
Senator John Heinz).
23 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 13. See also Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 172 (testi-
mony of Mr. John Subak, Group Vice President and General Counsel, Rohm & Haas Co.).
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ing errors and control weaknesses.24 Such severe penalties have under-
standably caused many companies to spend large sums to protect
themselves from the uncertainties of the FCPA's accounting provisions.
In addition, these provisions affect public companies regardless of
whether they engage in international business.25 All companies,
whether or not they conduct business overseas, must protect themselves
against the uncertainties of the FCPA's accounting provisions.
Anti-Bribery Provisions
Other provisions of the FCPA prohibit bribery of foreign offi-
cials.26 These sections are directed towards all domestic concerns and
towards any issuer that has a class of securities registered or that is
required to file reports with the SEC. The sections prohibit using "any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly" 27 in fur-
therance of an offer or payment of anything of value in order to influ-
ence a foreign official, political party or candidate. The Act also
prohibits such payments to "any person, while knowing or having rea-
son to know that all or a portion of such money or thing of value"
28
will be used to pay foreign officials or political parties, to help the is-
suer or domestic concern to obtain or retain business, or to direct busi-
ness to another person. The FCPA defines "domestic concern" as all
United States citizens and residents, as well as all businesses which
have their principal place of business in the United States, or are or-
ganized under the laws of a state, territory, possession, or common-
wealth of the United States.29 A "foreign official" is "any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or
on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instru-
mentality."30 Those whose duties are "essentially ministerial or cleri-
cal" are explicitly excluded, thereby allowing "facilitating" or "grease"
payments.3 A "grease" payment does not obtain or retain business.
Instead, it facilitates or expedites a business-related activity that a gov-
ernment employee is already required to perform. The classic example
24 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring compliance by "[e]very issuer which
has a class of securities registered. . . and every issuer which is required to file reports." (empha-
sis added)).
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I, 78dd-2 (Supp. IV 1980).
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
31 Id
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is paying $20 to a customs official to move the necessary papers before
the banana shipment rots on the dock.32 Such payments are allowed
under the FCPA, even though this practice is illegal in the United
States and in many other foreign countries.33 Criminal penalties under
the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are severe, with "any domestic
concern" potentially liable for fines up to $1,000,000. Individuals who
willfully violate the Act may be fined up to $10,000, or imprisoned up
to five years, or both.34 Jurisdiction over the FCPA's bribery provi-
sions is divided. The SEC retains civil authority over the companies
reporting to it, and the Justice Department maintains civil jurisdiction
over nonreporting companies. The Justice Department also has all
criminal enforcement authority.35
The anti-bribery provisions are a source of confusion and uncer-
tainty. In the General Accounting Office's review of the FCPA, sev-
enty percent of the respondents who reported that the FCPA caused a
decrease in their overseas business rated the clarity of at least one of the
anti-bribery provisions as "inadequate" or "very inadequate. 36 Al-
though it is hard to measure the amount of lost business opportunities
caused by ambiguities in the anti-bribery provisions, "[t]he fact that
this Act is consistently cited in surveys as one of the strongest disincen-
tives to exporting is the best evidence that it is a source of confusion
and uncertainty for exporters. 37 One area of confusion surrounds fa-
cilitating payments. Instead of expressly allowing customary facilitat-
ing payments, the FCPA excluded from its prohibitions payments to
those "whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical."' 38 This indi-
rect approach has created uncertainty as to the law's meaning, with
many payments that Congress never intended to forbid being withheld
as a consequence.39 The ambiguities have also resulted in greater costs
32 See, eg., H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 17.
33 The list of countries that prohibit facilitating payments includes both developed states, such
as France, Switzerland, and the United States, and developing states, such as Jordan, El Salvador,
and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, a large majority of the developing states prohibit facilitating pay-
ments. See Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of1977- A Solution or a Problem?, II
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 132 (1981).
34 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
35 See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
36 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 38.
37 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 391 (statement of Robert Graham, Governor of Florida,
on behalf of the National Governor's Association).
38 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The reports from both the Sen-
ate and the House explicitly state that the FCPA did not cover facilitating payments. See S. REP.
No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1977).
39 The United States Chamber of Commerce found that due to the ambiguities of the FCPA,
some companies have discontinued granting small payments to customs officials to expedite ap-
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to those who have made facilitating payments. In one instance, a com-
pany spent $30,000 investigating a $20 payment to a customs official.4°
The FCPA's focus on the recipient of facilitating payments, instead of
on their purposes, is the main cause of the ambiguity.4' If the goal is to
prohibit payments for certain purposes only, then a clear and effective
guideline must squarely address these purposes. In its facilitating pay-
ment provisions, the FCPA fails to achieve this goal.
The FCPA also contains ambiguities concerning the differences
between bribes and gifts or legitimate business expenses. Even the Sen-
ate Banking Committee indicated that the term "corruptly" 42 was used
to make clear that the payment "must be intended to induce the recipi-
ent to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business
to the payor or his client," and defined "corruptly" to require an "evil
motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. 43
Despite these explanations, some United States government officials
have applied the statute to routine social gifts and to business ex-
penses."4 As long as the actual language of the FCPA does not define
allowable gifts and business expenses, conflicting interpretations are
inevitable.
Other ambiguities are contained in the "reason to know" provi-
sions.45 Under these provisions, domestic concerns are liable for any
corrupt political payments made overseas, if the domestic concern
knows or has reason to know of the transaction. Although Congress
may impose criminal sanctions on a principal for acts of its agent, per-
formed within the scope of the agent's employment,46 there is no simi-
lar "reason to know" standard in United States domestic bribery
laws.47 The real problem with the provisions, however, lies in the lack
proval of export and import papers, gasoline to policemen in order to permit patrol of company
facilities more frequently, and other types of payments which Congress did not intend to prohibit.
H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERO, supra note 2, at 18.
40 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 8 (opening statement of Senator Chafee).
41 See id at 150 (statement of Robert McNell for the Emergency Committee for American
Trade).
42 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
43 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). See also H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1977).
44 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 154 (statement of Robert McNeill).
45 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
46 See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (partnership held
criminally liable for the acts of its agents, even though the partners did not participate in the
infraction); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (under the Sherman Act, a corporation is liable for the acts of its agents
within the scope of their authority, even when the agents act against company orders).
47 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 63 (testimony of William E. Brock, United States
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of guidelines defining "reason to know."48 By definition, such guide-
lines are based on hindsight: whether the company should have known
of a particular result had it exercised "reasonable" control procedures,
even if the company could not reasonably control the agent's actions.49
Under the FCPA, a company and its directors and officers may be lia-
ble for an agent's actions that are more clearly visible in hindsight than
in foresight. Such ambiguity leads to greater costs in finding and using
acceptable agents.5 0 For example, if an agent who gathers more busi-
ness than others has bribed to obtain business, while receiving a slightly
larger commission, should the company have realized he was using his
extra commission to bribe government officials? In such cases, compa-
nies might not employ an agent, even if a thorough examination of his
background revealed no history of bribery, simply for the uncertainty
of the "reason to know" standard." This standard especially burdens
smaller businesses, since they often rely exclusively on foreign agents to
obtain foreign business. 2 The sheer intrusiveness of the investigation
which companies feel compelled by the Act to conduct may cause com-
panies to lose experienced agents or encounter difficulty recruiting new
ones.
53
As a matter of public policy, it seems appropriate that a statute
prohibiting bribery should prohibit bribes through third persons. How-
ever, it seems unreasonable to impose stricter requirements abroad
than at home. Though some have argued that by dropping the "reason
to know" standard, the United States would allow companies to pay
Trade Representative). See also id at 169 (statement of John Subak: "Liability can attach even
though traditional standards of criminal liability for the actions of others would not give rise to
liability.").
48 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 63 (testimony of William Brock: "Well, frankly, nobody
knows what ['reason to know'] . . .means, and therefore in some cases and [sic] quite a few
companies have withdrawn from doing business where there is any question about it .... .
49 See id at 164 (testimony of John Subak).
50 See, e.g., id at 432 (statement of Harvey Pitt: "[M]ore often than not [the reason to know
standard] ... results in corporations attempting, in good faith, to satisfy a standard they cannot
comprehend at undue expense. The end product is often uncertainty and an impressive 'paper
trail,' but not necessarily the result Congress originally desired.").
51 See id at 247 (testimony of Norman Pacun).
52 For example, Shaw Mudge & Co. recently ceased conducting business in Africa, Pakistan,
and the Moslem countries because of agency problems arising under the FCPA. Id at 273 (testi-
mony of Shaw Mudge).
53 See id at 266 (statement of Mark Feldman:
The predictable response of many agents to such proposals by U.S. companies is to refuse to
do business with them. Foreign businessmen have no desire to become enmeshed in proce-
dures required by U.S. law or to risk embarrassing inquiries into their business practices.
They can find other customers for their services.).
See also id at 169 (statement of John Subak); H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at
25; GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 39.
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giant sales commissions and avoid liability simply by not asking how
the commissions were spent,54 such blatant acts would not go unpun-
ished since such "negligence" would violate the internal controls re-
quirements of the FCPA's accounting provisions." The "reason to
know" provisions of the FCPA have done little toward solving the
problem intended, and have cost United States businesses greatly in
lost business opportunities and agent investigations.
Another shortcoming of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions is that
the Act prohibits conduct that is legal in many countries, and allows
acts that are prohibited by the internal laws of some nations.56 For
example, many countries authorize companies to make political contri-
butions,5 while such contributions are clearly illegal under the
FCPA.58 Other nations forbid facilitating payments59 that the FCPA
permits United States companies to make abroad.60 Forbidding certain
practices by United States concerns that are legal in some countries
puts United States companies at an automatic disadvantage. By
prohibiting practices and payments that have become standard and
well-accepted methods of doing business in a country, foreign compa-
nies operating without such restrictions gain an advantage in that coun-
try. For example, in many countries, social gestures such as gifts or
entertainment are not only permitted under local laws, but are neces-
sary before business can be transacted.61 The problem is compounded
by the fact that a foreign agent of a United States company may fully
comply with his nation's laws, yet the company may be liable for his
actions under the FCPA.62 Another effect of such FCPA prohibitions
is the unwillingness of foreign officials to do business with United
States companies because of the concern that United States courts and
media will label them "corrupt," even though they comply fully with
54 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 411 (testimony of William Dobrovir:
To eliminate the reason to know, it would allow a company to hire a local agent who was the
minister's brother-in-law, who was recommended by the minister, pay him double the usual
commission, make sure he did not tell them what he did with it, and enjoy with impunity the
fruits of his bribery.).
55 See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
56 For a thorough examination of foreign internal bribery laws, see Comment, supra note 33,
at 131-34.
57 The list of such countries includes Canada and the United Kingdom, which do not even
require disclosure. In addition, West Germany provides tax deductions for such contributions.
See id at 133.
58 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
59 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
61 H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 21.
62 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 195 (statement of Joseph Creighton).
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their national law.63 Not prohibiting acts illegal in other countries
poses minor problems as well. For example, a company relying on the
FCPA to set standards of behavior may find itself in violation of for-
eign law if it gives a facilitating payment in a country where facilitating
payments are illegal.'
Problems also arise because the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA are enforced by two federal bodies. The SEC has civil jurisdic-
tion over companies reporting to it, while the Justice Department has
civil jurisdiction over everyone else and all criminal actions.65 Indica-
tive of the problems of dual jurisdiction was a Practicing Law Institute
seminar where representatives of the SEC and Justice Department dis-
agreed on interpretations of FCPA provisions.66 How substantial a de-
terrent dual enforcement may be to foreign business was manifested
when the Justice Department instituted its review procedures. Under
the Department's review procedure, a United States company or do-
mestic concern that wishes to know whether certain actions fall within
the FCPA agrees to give the Justice Department access to all relevant
records. The Justice Department then attempts to determine within
thirty days whether the proposed actions violate the FCPA. If the Re-
view Board determines that the actions would not violate the FCPA, it
issues a binding opinion letter stating that the Justice Department will
not bring action. However, the letter is not binding if the Justice De-
partment determines that information was withheld, and evidence of
other illegal acts discovered during the review can be used against the
company or concern. 67  Because of dual enforcement of the FCPA's
anti-bribery provisions, companies are not willing to rely solely on the
Justice Department's binding opinion letter.68
Overall, the FCPA has succeeded in preventing bribery by United
States concerns in foreign countries, but it has cost those concerns in
lost business and increased operating costs. The ambiguities of the ac-
63 H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 13.
64 For a discussion of the countries that prohibit facilitating payments, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text; Comment, supra note 33, at 132.
65 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
66 Practicing Law Institute Seminar, Chicago, Illinois, March 22-23, 1979, reprinted in FOR-
EIGN CORRUPT PRACTicES AcT REPORTER 109-30 (Bus. Laws, Inc. 1980).
67 Justice Department comments, reprinted in appendix to GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at
117.
68 Five months after the Justice Department instituted its review procedure, the SEC an-
nounced that it would not prosecute corporations for transactions which the Justice Department
cleared. However, the SEC reserved the right to determine the need for enforcement action inde-
pendently irrespective of the Justice Department's actions. The SEC also reserved the right to
take issue with the results of the Justice Department procedure. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16,
at 44.
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counting provisions have forced many companies to increase greatly
their internal controls to ensure compliance. Dual enforcement and the
"reason to know" standard may convince a United States company to
avoid foreign markets. The many ambiguities of the FCPA, coupled
with stiff penalties, prevent United States concerns from doing business
competitively with those unencumbered by the FCPA. The FCPA
needs revision. Bribery by United States concerns can be prohibited
without needlessly injuring those United States concerns: "As is often
the case with the Government's effort to codify and regulate a moral
standard, the fault is not with the objective but with the
implementation."69
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE FCPA
The BPRA 's Effect on Accounting Standards
The Business Practices and Records Act (BPRA) would remove
much uncertainty from the FCPA's accounting requirements for issuers
regulated by the SEC. The Senate's bill retains the "reasonable detail,"
"reasonable assurance," and "accurately and fairly" language of the
FCPA.7° However, the BPRA clarifies and defines these phrases within
the context of the Act. The BPRA would supplement the "reasonable
detail" standard with explicit requirements of reasonable detail in
records in order to "permit preparation of financial statements in con-
formity with generally accepted accounting principles ... and to
maintain accountability for assets." 7' The BPRA would also define
"reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurance" as "such level of detail
and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent individuals in the
conduct of their own affairs, having in mind a comparison between
benefits to be obtained and costs to be incurred in obtaining such bene-
fits."72 Due to the cost-benefit form of the definition, companies would
no longer need to employ control systems larger than costs justify
merely to prevent FCPA liability.
Moreover, although the Senate's bill does not add a "financial
statement" materiality standard to the accounting provisions as Senator
69 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 6 (opening statement of Senator John Heinz, Chairman,
Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy).
70 Section 4(a) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934). Full text of the proposed BPRA is in appendix. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompa-
nying text.
71 Section 4(a) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934) (see appendix).
72 Section 6 of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
as § 13(b)(6)) (see appendix).
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Chafee originally proposed,73 the BPRA would impose liability only
for failing to reach such level of detail and degree of assurance "as
would satisfy prudent individuals in the conduct of their own affairs."7 4
Since relatively minor omissions would no longer give rise to liability,
companies would no longer need to bear unreasonable accounting costs
merely to protect themselves from the FCPA.
The Senate bill also provides guidelines for the Act's "accurately
and fairly" provisions. The BPRA requires scienter for liability under
the accounting provisions, with liability arising only if an issuer of se-
curities has acted in bad faith, or if an officer of the issuer knowingly
caused the issuer to violate the Act.75 This provision protects issuers
from liability for innocent errors in bookkeeping. An issuer would still
be liable for "knowingly" failing to maintain adequate internal con-
trols76 or for "knowingly circumventing a system of internal accounting
controls,"" and for failing to adhere to the section 13(b)(2)(A) require-
ments to prepare records of the issuer's transactions "in reasonable de-
tail." 78 Therefore, the addition of a scienter requirement would not
permit issuers to evade all liability by merely "turning their corporate
heads" or maintaining an accounting system inadequate for the issuers'
needs. The BPRA also removes all criminal liability for violations of
the FCPA's accounting provisions.79 In passing the FCPA, Congress
intended the accounting standards "to operate in tandem with the
criminalization provisions of the bill to deter corporate bribery,"8 0 yet
the FCPA's provisions impose criminal liability whether or not there is
evidence of bribery. Under the BPRA, however, if the SEC discovers
an accounting practice "to cover up" an illicit payment, the company
and its officers would be criminally liable under the anti-bribery provi-
sions.8' Without the threat of criminal liability, corporate executives
who did not knowingly authorize bribes would no longer feel pressured
73 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 14-16.
74 Section 6 of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
as § 13(b)(6)) (see appendix).
75 Section 4(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as § 13(b)(5)) (see appendix).
76 See id
77 See section 4(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 as § 13(b)(6)) (see appendix).
78 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
79 Section 4(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as § 13(b)(4)) (see appendix).
80 123 CoNG. REc. 13,819 (1977).
81 See section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the FCPA as § 104(d)(3)) (see
appendix).
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to spend excessive amounts on internal control just to protect them-
selves from possible prison sentences.
Another BPRA addition to section 13 of the Securities Exchange
Act would require an issuer holding fifty percent or less of a domestic
or foreign firm to use "good faith" in influencing the firm to follow the
BPRA's accounting guidelines.8 2 This resolves the FCPA's uncertainty
as to whether an issuer would be liable for accounting violations of
another firm wholly or partially owned by the issuer. 3 This section
would provide that if the issuer does not have direct control of the firm
(i.e., owning fifty percent or less), the issuer would have a duty to influ-
ence the firm to comply with the BPRA's accounting standards. Possi-
ble confusion may arise, however, over how the issuer fulfills its "good
faith" obligation. The only guideline supplied is that the issuer should
exert influence "to the extent reasonable under the issuer's circum-
stances," including the relative degree of ownership and the laws and
practices of the country in which the firm is located.84 Despite this un-
certainty, in light of the other shortcomings of the FCPA concerning
ownership of domestic and foreign firms, this section of the BPRA
would be a welcome step forward, providing guidelines regarding an
issuer's liability for the records of a firm it owns either wholly or in
part.
The BPRA would likely not result in an immediate dismantling of
issuers' accounting departments. Even before the FCPA was enacted
in 1977, United States corporations had already begun implementing
stronger accounting policies and procedures to prevent a recurrence of
the type of misconduct discovered during the Watergate investiga-
tions.85 In addition, the BPRA would retain the FCPA's stiff penalties
in civil actions.86 The BPRA's clarifications of accounting require-
ments for issuers would, however, remove much unnecessary bookwork
currently performed merely to ensure compliance with the FCPA.
These changes would require a sufficiently high level of quality in an
issuer's accounting practices and internal controls, yet would not re-
82 Section 4(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as § 13(b)(5)) (see appendix).
83 Implicit in this section is the requirement that any firm which the issuer controls (i.e., owns
more than fifty percent), whether foreign or domestic, must meet the requirements of the BPRA's
accounting provisions.
84 Section 4(b) of the proposed BPRA (proposed addition to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as § 13(b)(6)) (see appendix).
85 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 160 (statement of Robert McNeill).
86 Except for the removal of criminal liability (supra note 80 and accompanying text), the
BPRA includes no amendments to section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
governs the penalties for the entire Act except for section 30A (section 103 of the FCPA).
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quire the expenditure of an unnecessarily high amount of resources to
meet with certainty the Act's standards.
The BPRA 's Effect on Anti-Bribery Standards
The most obvious change to anti-bribery standards proposed by
the BPRA is the total repeal of section 103 of the FCPA (section 30A of
the Securities Exchange Act). 7 This is not, however, nearly as signifi-
cant as it appears, for sections 103 and 104 of the FCPA are nearly
identical. The major difference is that section 103 covers acts of con-
cerns regulated by the SEC, while section 104 covers acts of all other
domestic concerns. Since section 5 of the BPRA would apply to all
domestic concerns, including those currently covered by section 103 of
the FCPA,88 total repeal of section 103 would not create a new class of
concerns exempt from liability under United States foreign anti-bribery
laws. The real significance of this repeal would be the termination of
the dual enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions, giving the Justice
Department sole jurisdiction over violations of the Act's anti-bribery
provisions.89 This would eliminate the current confusion inherent in
dual enforcement under the SEC's and Justice Department's differing
interpretations of the FCPA.90 By following the Justice Department's
guidelines, a United States concern could be reasonably certain that it
was complying with the BPRA's anti-bribery provisions.
In addition, the BPRA would codify the Justice Department's re-
view procedure and would authorize the Department to issue guide-
lines concerning compliance with the BPRA. 91 Absent the threat of
SEC prosecution for acts approved by the Justice Department, use of
the review procedure would increase with the passage of the BPRA.
Similarly, Justice Department guidelines under the BPRA would au-
thoritatively outline what constitutes a violation of the anti-bribery
provisions. The increased certainty would result in economic benefits
to United States concerns. No longer would an issuer need to protect
itself from the vague guidelines of the SEC 92 by avoiding business op-
87 Section 5(a) of the proposed BPRA (see appendix).
88 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (amends § 104(a) and adds § 104(f) to the FCPA) (see
appendix).
89 Id (adding § 104(e) to the FCPA) (see appendix).
90 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
91 Section 8 of the proposed BPRA (see appendix). The Justice Department's review proce-
dure is discussed supra at note 68 and accompanying text.
92 The SEC has stated that "greater clarity [in the FCPA cannot] be reconciled with the policy
of Congress to eradicate corporate bribery of foreign officials," suggesting that acceptable corpo-
rate behavior is possible only under guidelines so vague as to force overly cautious behavior.
These comments are reprinted in the appendix to GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 105.
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portunities that the Justice Department would approve. The BPRA
would provide certainty, discouraging practices which Congress in-
tended to prohibit, and encouraging practices which Congress intended
to permit. The resulting end of overcautious behavior would yield sig-
nificant economic benefits to United States firms, without permitting
any "questionable" practices.
Another BPRA change to section 104(a) of the FCPA would re-
move the word "agent." While this would not exempt United States
concerns from liability for their foreign agents' acts, 93 the United States
would no longer prosecute the agent himself under its anti-bribery laws
for actions performed on foreign soil. Since agents of United States
entities would no longer be concerned about potential liability under
two sets of laws, this would provide more incentive for agents to work
for United States companies.
The BPRA also explicitly authorizes facilitating payments.9 4 In-
stead of allowing payments to certain officials, as under the FCPA,95
the BPRA would permit payments for particular purposes, "to facilitate
or expedite performance by such foreign official of his official duties." 96
This would eliminate confusion over what are ministerial or clerical
duties,97 and would advance the original intent of Congress to author-
ize facilitating payments.9 8 Since enforcement officials have raised
doubts as to whether the FCPA permits facilitating payments,99 the
BPRA would directly address this uncertainty by explicitly authorizing
these payments. Questions may arise as to what "official duties" in-
lude. For example, would the BPRA permit a payment to an official
whose "official duty" was to determine which aircraft his government
would buy? Though it may be argued that such a payment may "expe-
dite" the purchasing process, the payment would undoubtedly violate
the Act. First, the payment might be considered as corruptly influenc-
ing the official's decision. This is forbidden by the strongest and most
93 For a discussion of liability for an agent's actions under the BPRA, see infra notes 111-1 14
and accompanying text.
94 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
95 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
96 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
97 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
98 See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) ("The statute does not, therefore, cover
so-called 'grease payments,' such as payments for expediting shipments through customs .. ");
H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1977) ("The language ofthis bill is deliberately cast in
terms which differentiate between [corrupt] payments and facilitating payments.. See also
S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
99 Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 255, 265 (testimony of Mark Feldman).
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likely provision to govern such a payment. 00 Second, the example
may violate the requirement that such payments be customary in the
foreign country.'0 ' This assumes, of course, that business in that coun-
try does not normally require such payments. Finally, in the unlikely
event that the above two provisions are determined not to prevent this
type of payment, the Justice Department may exercise authority under
section 8 of the proposed BPRA to issue guidelines stating that the Act
prohibits such payments. Thus, while the proposed Act raises legiti-
mate questions regarding what may be considered facilitating pay-
ments, other provisions of the BPRA address most of these questions.
The provisions of the BPRA that allow facilitating payments would be
much more workable than those of the FCPA. The BPRA would, in
effect, make explicit the original wishes of Congress in passing the
FCPA.102 This clarification should result in less delay for visas, import
papers, and repair parts, less spoilage of perishable goods, more cer-
tainty among United States concerns, and, consequently, significant
economic benefits and savings.
The BPRA would also explicitly allow gifts intended as "a cour-
tesy, a token of regard and esteem, or in return for hospitality." 0 3 In
some countries, courtesy gifts are not only permitted under local law,
but are necessary before business may be transacted. 04 By legalizing
these payments, the BPRA would allow United States businesses that
abandoned particular markets due to uncertainties in the FCPA to re-
enter these markets. As in the facilitating standards, the BPRA's gift
provisions present questions of potential abuse. However, an unusually
large gift would most likely be found corruptly to influence the officiars
decisions, 0 5 or to be more than just a courtesy, token of regard, or
return for hospitality. 06 As in the case of facilitating payments, if
questions arise as to what is permitted, the Justice Department may
issue guidelines.0 7 The BPRA would likewise explicitly permit ex-
penses related to the demonstration and explanation of products, in-
cluding travel and lodging, if such marketing activities,
demonstrations, explanations, or related expenses pertain to a business
presentation "associated with the selling or purchasing of goods or
100 See § 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(a) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
101 See § 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
102 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(3) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
104 H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 21.
105 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(a) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
106 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(3) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
107 Section 8 of the proposed BPRA (see appendix).
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services.""' As with the gift provisions, there remains the possibility of
abuse. A United States firm that brings its foreign clients to Hawaii for
a week to demonstrate a refrigeration system would have to show that
the expenses were related to or necessary for the demonstration 10 9 and
that the action was not taken to influence an official's decisions. 110
Overall, this clarification should prevent lost business opportunities
caused by businesses' reluctance to pay legitimate expenses to show
products to potential foreign clients, and should not allow much abuse
in the classification of demonstration expenses.
The BPRA would remove the "reason to know" standard of ac-
countability for agents' actions under section 104(a)(3) of the FCPA." II
Eliminating this standard would greatly reduce the costs of maintain-
ing foreign agents. United States concerns would no longer need to
conduct overly extensive and intrusive investigations into a prospective
agent's background, which, in addition to the cost, might discourage
totally acceptable and highly qualified people from applying to work
for United States companies. A United States concern would also no
longer need to conduct overly extensive and intrusive checks on busi-
ness done by its agents to assure that it has no "reason to know" of any
possibly illegal activity. Although many have argued that removing
the "reason to know" standard would result in corporations ignoring its
agents' actions to escape all liability, 12 such arguments overlook the
requirements of the accounting provisions to keep books in reasonable
detail." 3 Any significant lack of control over agents could result in
prosecution under the Act's accounting provisions, with a possible fine
of $10,000 for individuals, or up to $500,000 "when such person is an
exchange."' I" With such strict penalties, it would not profit a firm to
violate the accounting provisions in order to escape the anti-bribery
requirements.
Yet it may be preferable to leave a well-defined remnant of "rea-
son to know" to make more explicit Congress' intent to prevent United
States concerns from purposely ignoring their agents' actions. Such a
108 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(4) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
109 Id
110 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(a) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
11 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
112 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 396 (statement of Senator William Proxmire: "The
obvious problem with the 'director authorizes' standard is that it encourages an ostrich or a head-
in-the-sand approach."). See also id at 411 (testimony of William Dobrovir); id at 487 (testimony
of Harold Williams, former SEC chairman).
113 Section 4(a) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934) (see appendix).
114 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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provision should specify signposts to alert a company that its agents are
using corrupt methods to obtain business. An example of such a sign-
post may be an agent who consistently wins business in spite of lower
bids by competitors. Ignoring such signposts would constitute a viola-
tion if an agent employed corrupt practices to obtain or retain business.
A "reason to know" standard would also protect United States con-
cerns from liability if they follow certain guidelines in monitoring their
agents. If reasonable, well-defined guidelines are supplied, a "reason
to know" standard would encourage businesses to deter their agents
from engaging in illegal conduct while avoiding the uncertainty costs of
the current FCPA standards. Still, passage of the BPRA even without
a "reason to know" standard would improve the FCPA. The BPRA
would remove the costs of uncertainty caused by the FCPA's total lack
of definition for the "reason to know" standard. Removing the stan-
dard would not introduce the possibility of future abuses of the system
because of the accompanying provisions.
The BPRA includes one general exception to its anti-bribery pro-
visions, allowing any payment or gift "which is lawful under the laws
and regulations of the country" of the recipient foreign official.1 15 This
would override any other anti-bribery provision in the BPRA whenever
the laws of the recipient's country authorize the payment. Currently,
United States concerns must forego considerable business opportunities
because actions permitted in a foreign market and allowed by foreign
competitors are illegal under the FCPA. This section would also avoid
the criticism that the FCPA attempts to export United States moral-
ity." 6 Allowing United States concerns to follow business practices au-
thorized by foreign law adds an element of respect for the laws of other
nations absent from the FCPA. United States concerns could rely on
the laws of foreign countries in planning their conduct abroad, without
the concern of liability under the FCPA for otherwise legal activities.
In addition, the BPRA would afford little room for abuse of these pro-
visions. United States concerns could not circumvent the BPRA by
making a payment in Country X, which would permit the payment, to
an official of Country Y, whose laws prohibit the payment. The BPRA
expressly states that for the purposes of this section, the determining
factor is the law of the country where the recipient principally oper-
ates." 17 The BPRA would expressly forbid actions illegal both under its
115 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(2) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
116 See H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 13; Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977" A Unilateral Solution to an International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
227, 241 (1979).
117 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(2) of the FCPA) (see appendix).
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provisions and the laws of a foreign country, even if the laws are ig-
nored in the foreign country. The BPRA would allow an act only if a
foreign country's laws, not its customary practices, permit the act. Al-
though this would leave United States firms at a disadvantage to for-
eign concerns not operating under the BPRA, this would be a wise
prohibition. First, a system authorizing customary practices would be
uncertain. Until someone develops a workable definition for when a
practice is "customary," United States firms who wish to take advan-
tage of such a provision would expose themselves to risks that their
actions do not constitute "customary practices." Second, non-enforce-
ment of the country's law may not be permanent. A change of favor
with a particular official may result in prosecution in that country for
acts thought customary, and prosecution in that country would be
"proof' that the enforcing country intended its law to be obeyed, caus-
ing liability under United States anti-bribery laws. Finally, in light of
the possibility that "customary practices" may not always be ignored
by a country, allowing such an exception might expose United States
concerns to extortion by foreign enforcement officials. These officials
may realize that if they prosecute a United States concern for a "cus-
tomary" but illegal practice, the concern might be fined up to
$1,000,000 in United States courts. Even though disallowing custom-
ary but illegal practices that are prohibited under the BPRA would re-
sult in disadvantages to United States concerns, the protections
provided these concerns would justify the disadvantages.
The opposite aspect of this section is that the BPRA, like the
FCPA, would not make all acts illegal in a foreign country illegal
under United States anti-bribery laws."' Yet this would not be a ma-
jor shortcoming under the BPRA (nor is it under the FCPA1"g). The
United States would stand on the same ground as all the other coun-
tries of the world without internal prohibitions against foreign bribery.
The foreign nation would be free to prosecute any United States con-
cern for violations of that country's laws. This should deter any prac-
tices of which a nation seriously disapproves.
Overall, it appears that the proposed BPRA would prevent bribery
without unnecessarily restricting business abroad. The prohibitions
seem fair, and the definitions supplied seem complete. Due to the stiff
penalties retained from the FCPA, United States businesses would still
take steps to ensure compliance with the BPRA. Yet, due to the greater
118 For example, a United States concern would not be liable under the BPRA if it broke a
foreign law against facilitating payments. See Comment, supra note 33, at 132.
119 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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certainty of the BPRA, companies would not lose business by unneces-
sarily passing up profitable opportunities. The BPRA would provide
an effective deterrent against bribery as well as a workable standard for
business to follow.
THE BPRA AND INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO
CORRUPT BUSINESS PRACTICES
During the five years since the FCPA was passed, the literature
has been filled with calls for an international agreement to the problem
of foreign corrupt practices.120 Nonetheless, there is still no interna-
tional agreement, l2 1 and it appears that none will soon be reached.
122
It seems that an international agreement concerning corrupt business
practices would more likely result under the BPRA than under the
FCPA.
There are certain problems inherent in any attempted unilateral
action against a multilateral problem. The most serious dilemma is the
danger of alienating countries whose internal laws vary significantly
from that of the acting country. 2 ' Such is the situation under the
FCPA. The FCPA currently allows activities clearly illegal in many
countries, and restricts activities that are permissible in many coun-
tries.' 24 In contrast, the BPRA would provide more consistency with
the laws of other nations. 25 For that reason, the BPRA would remove
120 See, e.g., Atkeson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977- An International Application
of SEC'S Corporate Governance Reforms, 12 INTL LAW. 703, 720 (1978); Solomon & Linville,
Transnational Conduct of American Multinational Corporations: Questionable Payments Abroad,
17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 303, 344 (1976); Comment, Bribes Kickbacks, andPolitical Contri-
butions in Foreign Countries: The Nature and Scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Power to Regulate and Control American Corporate Behavior, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1231, 1266.
121 See, e.g., Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments: Enforcing a MultilateralAgreement, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 117, 121 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Multilateral Enforcement]; H.
WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 2, at 29; Lashbrooke, supra note 116, at 240. See also
Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 44 (testimony of William Brock); id at 76 (testimony of Edward
Schmults).
122 For a thorough discussion of various attempts at international agreement, see supra the
articles and comments in notes 120-21 supra. See also Coonrod, The United Nations Code of
Conductfor Transnational Corporations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J 273 (1977); Note, Legislating Business
Morality: A Look at Efforts by Two International Organizations to Deal with Questionable Behavior
by Transnational Corporations, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1977).
123 See, eg., Lashbrooke, supra note 116, at 235.
124 See Comment, supra note 33. See also supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
125 See § 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (to amend § 104(c)(2) of the FCPA) (see appendix). This
section would make payments to officials that are permissible under the host country's laws allow-
able under the BPRA. The BPRA would still authorize payments in some circumstances that are
illegal in some countries. However, this should not be a problem, since the possibility of prosecu-
tion under the host country's laws should deter such practices if the host country seriously wishes
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part of the barrier to an international solution to the problem of cor-
rupt payments to government officials.
Still, it has been suggested that amending the FCPA would end the
search for an international solution, under the assumption that the
United States would no longer have an interest in pursuing such a solu-
tion if it no longer bore the huge costs of the FCPA.126 This argument
ignores the realities of the BPRA. First, United States concerns would
still bear a cost that those from other nations would not incur (although
the costs would be less than under the FCPA). Even though the BPRA
would permit all payments allowed by the laws of the host country,
United States companies would lose business when the host country
and the BPRA both forbade the same activity (such as payments to
political parties), if the host country did not enforce its own provisions,
allowing concerns from other countries to make such payments. Sec-
ond, even if there were no unilateral costs associated with the BPRA,
the United States would still seek an international solution to the prob-
lem of corrupt payments to government officials. Whether one attrib-
utes the United States efforts to morality or to a desire for a greater
share of the world market, the United States has taken and remains
committed to take the initiative in the search for international agree-
ment.' 27 Third, the Senate proposal contains provisions authorizing
Congress to urge the President to achieve international agreement on
the corrupt payments problem. 128 The FCPA contains no such provi-
sions. Fourth, the BPRA, by amending section 104(c)(2) of the
FCPA, 29 would be more consistent than the FCPA with the internal
laws of other nations. This greater respect for the laws of other nations
should result in greater willingness on the part of other countries to
to enforce its provisions. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. Still, there is the prob-
lem of foreign reaction to the United States exporting its morality.
126 See Comment, Multilateral Enforcement, supra note 121, at 150.
127 Atkeson, supra note 120, at 705 n.8 (1978) (discussing United States proposals before the
United Nations and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development). Regarding
current United States initiatives, see Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 58 (statement of William
Brock:
Our statement as a nation is clear on the issue of illicit payments, and our leadership toward
an international effort in this area will be strengthened because we will have demonstrated to
our trading partners that it is possible to create a reasonable and fair, yet comprehensive and
stringent prohibition against the bribing of foreign officials.).
See also id at 76 (statement of Ernest Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs, Department of State: "We cannot now predict the final form of any interna-
tional agreement, but we are striving for positive, enforceable, objective criteria that can be clearly
applied by governments and adhered to by business.").
128 See § 9 of the proposed BPRA (see appendix).
129 Section 5(b) of the proposed BPRA (see appendix). This provision allows any type of pay-
ment that is legal in the foreign official's country.
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negotiate an international settlement, since the BPRA should alleviate
anxieties of having United States morals forced upon them. 3° Fifth, as
United States firms become increasingly competitive in foreign markets
under the BPRA,' 3' foreign companies will profit less than they cur-
rently do from the lack of a unified standard. As the profitability of
certain acts decreases, the desirability of a uniform code of conduct
should increase.
The BPRA does not ensure a unified agreement on corporate con-
duct. Yet the Act would solidify the United States commitment to an
international consensus, and would remove incentives for other nations
to avoid agreement. Overall, the BPRA is a positive step in the search
for an international solution to the problem of corrupt corporate
practices.
EFFECTS OF THE BPRA ON PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
The BPRA would substantially affect the amount of private busi-
ness performed by United States firms overseas. Neither the FCPA nor
the proposed BPRA prohibits bribery of private foreign concerns for
the purpose of obtaining or retaining private transactions. Enforce-
ment against private payments is governed by the host nation. The
FCPA excluded many United States businesses from certain foreign
governmental markets, and many companies abandoned these coun-
tries altogether, 31 presumably because it was not profitable to remain
in the market for only private transactions within the country. How-
ever, by once again opening those foreign governmental markets, the
BPRA would make it more cost-effective for United States companies
to do business with private concerns in those countries. Whereas in
some markets the possibility of private transactions may not alone jus-
tify the expense of doing business in a country, the addition of the gov-
ernment as a potential buyer may make many such operations
profitable again.
Due to the failure of United States law to address the issue of
bribes to private concerns in foreign lands, such bribery is regulated
solely by the host country's laws. Yet many developing states do not
130 See Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 44 (statement of William Brock). See also id at 58:
"Once the U.S. business community and the U.S. government stand together in support of a prac-
ticable law of this type that respects the laws and customs of other nations, our credibility and
influence as a world leader against bribery will be greatly enhanced."
131 See supra notes 87-119 and accompanying text.
132 See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 15 ("About 45 percent of the respondents that reported
lost business stated that the act has limited the number of countries in which they do business.").
See also id at 39.
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prohibit bribes to those who are not public officials. 33 As in the area of
corrupt governmental payoffs, this appears to be an area that would
benefit greatly from an international consensus as to what should be
allowed.
CONCLUSION
The FCPA's purpose of stopping corrupt payments is commenda-
ble; in practice, however, the Act has failed to solve the problem with-
out causing major problems of its own. The FCPA's accounting
provisions provide inadequate guidance as to what is required, and
companies, therefore, often employ much greater controls than would
otherwise be used. Likewise, uncertainties in the anti-bribery provi-
sions have also caused excessively cautious behavior.
The BPRA, if enacted, would also prohibit bribery. Yet the
BPRA's definitions of key terms would create certainty as to whether
companies were complying with the Act. Under the BPRA, companies
would no longer find it necessary to employ wasteful accounting con-
trol systems, due to the Act's specificity and removal of criminal sanc-
tions. United States companies could compete more effectively in
foreign markets since the BPRA would eliminate many of the FCPA's
disadvantages. United States companies could once again pay for le-
gitimate expenses and make reasonable facilitating payments without
concern about liability under the FCPA. Eliminating the "reason to
know" standard would enable United States concerns to compete once
again for the best foreign agents. The increased governmental business
opportunities under the BPRA would also result in increased business
with private foreign concerns, since it is more practical to enter a mar-
ket if both governmental and private markets are open. Most impor-
tantly, the BPRA would more effectively induce an international
agreement concerning corrupt foreign payments. The removal of the
FCPA's windfalls to foreign businesses coupled with the BPRA's re-
quirements for United States action should encourage an international
solution to the problem of corrupt payments to foreign officials.
Laws dictating ethics will always cost someone money. When only
one nation seeks to reform worldwide corrupt practices, as the United
States attempted to do in enacting the FCPA, discontent arises since
the people of that one country suffer all the resulting economic loss.
Until the world achieves a unified agreement, however, the United
133 One author noted that a consistent difference between developed and developing states is
that developed states usually prohibit illicit payments to individuals who are not public officials,
whereas developing states usually allow these payments. Comment, supra note 33, at 131.
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States must enforce some restraints to prevent corrupt payments by its
companies to foreign officials. The BPRA is an appropriate measure to
take at this time because it would effectively prohibit corrupt payments
without unduly restricting business opportunities.
John W Duncan
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APPENDIX
S. 708, BUSINESS ACCOUNTING AND FOREIGN TRADE
SIMPLIFICATION ACT*
AMENDMENT OF SHORT TITLE
Sec. 3. Section 101 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is
amended to read as follows:
SHORT TITLE
Sec. 101. This title may be cited as the 'Business Practices and
Records Act'.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Sec. 4. (a) Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
is amended to read as follows:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file re-
ports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that-
(A) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;
(B) transactions are recorded as necessary (i) to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements,
and (ii) to maintain accountability for assets;
(C) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment's general or specific authorization;
(D) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken
with respect to any differences; and
* This proposed Act, amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed the United States
Senate and was sent to the House of Representatives on Nov. 23, 1981. 127 CONG. REc. S13,983-
85 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981).
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(E) for the purposes of subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this par-
agraph, the issuer makes and keeps books, accounting records, and ac-
counts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.
(b) Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
(4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply
with the requirements of paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(5) No civil injunctive relief shall be imposed with respect to-
(A) any issuer for failing to comply with the requirements of para-
graph (2) of this subsection if such issuer shall show that it acted in
good faith in attempting to comply with such requirements; or
(B) any person other than an issuer, in connection with an issuer's
failure to comply with paragraph (2), unless such person knowingly
caused the issuer to fail to devise or maintain a system of internal ac-
counting controls that complies with paragraph (2).
(6) No person shall knowingly circumvent a system of internal ac-
counting controls established pursuant to paragraph (2) for a purpose
inconsistent with paragraph (2).
(7) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pur-
suant to section 12 of this title or an issuer which is required to file
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title holds 50 per centum or less
of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, the pro-
visions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed in good
faith to use its influence to the extent reasonable under the issuer's cir-
cumstances, including the relative degree of its ownership over the do-
mestic or foreign firm and under the laws and practices governing the
business operations of the country in which such firm is located, to
cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls consistent with paragraph (2). Such an is-
suer shall be conclusively presumed to have complied with the provi-
sions of paragraph (2) by demonstrating good faith efforts to use such
influence.
REPEALER; NEW BRIBERY PROVISION
Sec. 5. (a)(1) Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
repealed.
(2) Section 32 of such Act is amended-
(A) by striking out "(other than section 30A)" in subsection (a);
and
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(B) by striking out subsection (c).
(b) Section 104 of the Business Practices and Records Act is
amended to read as follows:
FOREIGN PAYMENTS
Sec. 104. (a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, or any
officer, director, employee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of
such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of a pay-
ment, gift, offer, or promise, directly or indirectly, of anything of value
to any foreign official for the purpose of-
(1) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, or inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of his legal duty as a foreign official; or
(2) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a for-
eign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any
act or decision of such government or instrumentality;
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, or any officer,
director or employee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such
domestic concern to make use of the mails or any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce corruptly to direct or authorize, expressly
or by a course of conduct, a third party in furtherance of a payment,
gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a foreign official for any
of the purposes set forth in subsection (a).
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to -
(1) any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a rou-
tine governmental action by a foreign official;
(2) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a
foreign official which is lawful under the law and regulations of the
foreign official's country;
(3) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value which
constitutes a courtesy, a token of regard or esteem, or in return for
hospitality;
(4) any expenditures, including travel and lodging expenses, asso-
ciated with the selling or purchasing of goods or services or with the
demonstration or explanation of products; or
(5) any ordinary expenditures, including travel and lodging ex-
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penses, associated with the performance of a contract with a foreign
government or agency thereof.
(d)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any domestic
concern which violates subsection (a) or (b) shall, upon conviction, be
fined not more than $1,000,000.
(B) Any individual who is a domestic concern and who willfully
violates subsection (a) or (b) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(2) Any officer or director of a domestic concern, or stockholder
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates sub-
section (a) or (b) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(3) Whenever a domestic concern is found to have violated sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section, any employee of such domestic con-
cern who is a United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than an officer,
director, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic concern),
and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such viola-
tion shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this
subsection upon any officer, director, employee, or stockholder of a do-
mestic concern, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, by
such domestic concern.
(e)(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic
concern, or officer, director, employee, or stockholder thereof, is en-
gaged, or is about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a viola-
tion of subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of
the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper
showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary re-
straining order shall be granted without bond.
(2) For the purpose of all civil investigations which, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, are necessary and proper for the enforcement
of this Act, the Attorney General or any attorney or attorneys of the
Department of Justice designated by him are empowered to administer
oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require
the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the At-
torney General deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such attend-
ance of witnesses and the production of such documentary evidence
may be required from any place in the United States, or any territory,
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possession, or commonwealth of the United States, at any designated
place of hearing.
(3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued
to, any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any court
of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation
or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries on
business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of books, papers, or other documents. Any such court
may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Attorney
General or attorney designated by the Attorney General, there to pro-
duce records, if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order
of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. All
process in any such case may be served in the judicial district whereof
such person is an inhabitant or wherever he may be found. The Attor-
ney General shall have the power to make such rules relating to civil
investigations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of this subsection.
(f) As used in this section-
(1) The term 'domestic concern' means (A) any individual who is
a citizen, national or resident of the United States; or (B) any corpora-
tion, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, un-
incorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, which is organized
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession,
or commonwealth of the United States, which has a class of securities
registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, or which is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.
(2) The term 'foreign official' means (A) any officer or employee
of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality; or
(B) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for
foreign political office.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 6. Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
(6) For the purpose of this section, the terms 'reasonable assur-
ances' and 'reasonable detail' mean such level of detail and degree of
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assurance as would satisfy prudent individuals in the conduct of their
own affairs, having in mind a comparison between benefits to be ob-
tained and costs to be incurred in obtaining such benefits.
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION FOR OVERSEAS BRIBERY
Sec. 7. No criminal action pursuant to section 1341 or 1343 of title
18, United States Code, may be brought against a domestic concern, its
officers, directors, employees, or any shareholders thereof acting on be-
half of such domestic concern for a payment, gift, offer, or promise to a
foreign official based upon the theory that the foreign official or the
domestic concern violated a duty to or defrauded the foreign govern-
ment or the citizens of a foreign country.
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE GUIDELINES
Sec. 8. Title I of the Business Practices and Records Act is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
GUIDELINES AND GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE
Sec. 105. (a) Not later than six months after the date of enactment
of this section, the Attorney General, after consultation with the United
States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and after consultation
with representatives of the business community and the interested pub-
lic through public notice and comment and in public hearings, shall
determine to what extent the business community would be assisted by
further clarification of section 104 of this Act and shall, based on such
determination and to the extent necessary and appropriate, have the
authority to issue-
(1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct associated with
common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts
which the Attorney General determines constitute compliance with the
provisions of section 104 of this Act; and
(2) general precautionary procedures which issuers or domestic
concerns may use on a voluntary basis to ensure compliance with this
Act, and to create a rebuttable presumption of compliance with this
Act.
The guidelines and procedures referred to in the preceding sentence
shall be issued in accordance with sections 551 through 557 of title 5,
United States Code.
(b) The Attorney General, after consultation with other Federal
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agencies and representatives from the business community, shall estab-
lish a Business Practices and Records Act Review Procedure for the
purpose of providing responses to specific inquiries concerning enforce-
ment intentions under this Act. The Attorney General shall issue opin-
ions, within thirty days, in response to requests from domestic
concerns, regarding compliance with the requirements of the provisions
of section 104 of this Act. An opinion that certain prospective conduct
does not involve a violation shall be final and binding on all parties,
subject to the discovery of new evidence. When appropriate, and at
reasonable intervals, the responses derived from the review procedure
will be reviewed by the Attorney General to determine whether such
compilation of responses should be included in a new guideline pursu-
ant to subsection (a).
(c) Any document or other material provided to, received by, or
prepared in the Department of Justice, or any other department or
agency of the United States Government, in connection with a request
by a domestic concern for a statement of present enforcement inten-
tions under the Business Practices and Records Act Review Procedure
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, or in connection with any
investigations conducted to enforce this Act, shall be exempt from dis-
closure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, regardless of
whether the Department responds to such a request or the applicant
withdraws such request prior to receiving a response. The Attorney
General shall protect the privacy of each applicant, and shall adopt
rules assuring that materials, documents, and information submitted in
connection with a review procedure request will be kept confidential
and will not be used for any purpose that would unnecessarily discour-
age use of the review procedure. The review procedure shall be devel-
oped and instituted in accordance with sections 551 through 557 and
701 through 706 of title 5 United States Code.
(d) The Attorney General shall make a special effort to provide
timely compliance guidance to potential exporters, and smaller busi-
nesses, who as a practical matter are unable to obtain specialized coun-
sel on issues pertaining to this Act. Such assistance shall be limited to
requests for enforcement intention disclosures provided for under this
Act, and general explanation of compliance responsibilities and of po-
tential liabilities under the Act.
(e)(1) On September 1 of each year the Attorney General shall
transmit to the Congress and make public a detailed report on all ac-
tions which the Department of Justice has taken pursuant to this Act,
along with its views on problems associated with implementation, its
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plan for the next fiscal year to further implement the Act, and recom-
mendations for amendments.
(2) On September 1 of each year the Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission shall file with the Congress a detailed re-
port on all actions which the Commission has taken pursuant to section
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, its views on problems associated
with implementation, its plans for the next fiscal year to further imple-
ment such section, and its recommendations for amendment.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Sec. 9. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement among the largest
possible number of nations on illicit payments, including, a process by
which problems and conflicts associated with such practices could be
resolved.
(b) Within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
President shall report to Congress on-
(1) the progress of the negotiations referred to in subsection (a);
(2) those steps which the administration and Congress should con-
sider taking in the event that these negotiations do not successfully
eliminate the competitive disadvantage of United States business; and
(3) possible actions that could be taken to promote cooperation by
other nations in international efforts to prevent bribery of foreign offi-
cials, candidates, or parties in third countries.
This report shall also include recommendations for any new legislation
required to give the President authority to take appropriate action to
achieve such objectives. The report shall contain an analysis of the
potential effect on the interests of the United States including United
States national security of the corruption of foreign officials and polit-
ical leaders in connection with international business transactions in-
volving persons and business enterprises of other nations. In addition,
the report shall assess the current and future role in curtailing such
corruption of private initiatives such as the Recommendation to Gov-
ernments and Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery de-
veloped by the International Chamber of Commerce.
